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Abstract
We consider contest success functions (CSFs) that extract contestants’ values of
the prize. In the case in which the values are observable to the contest designer, in
the more-than-two-contestant or common-value subcase, we present a CSF extractive
in any equilibrium; in the other subcase, we present a CSF extractive in some equi-
librium, but there exists no CSF extractive in any equilibrium. In the case in which
the values are not observable, there exists no CSF extractive in some equilibrium.
In the case in which the values are observable and common, we present extractive
a CSF extractive in any equilibrium; we present a class of CSFs extractive in some
equilibrium, and this class can control the number of active contestants.
Keywords: contest success function; extraction of values; observability of values
aggregate effort equivalence across equilibria
JEL classification codes: C72; D72
∗The author is grateful to Kazuo Yamaguchi for his valuable comments. This work was supported by
JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP19K01563.
†Faculty of Economics, Meijo University, 1-501 Shiogamaguchi, Tempaku-ku, Nagoya 468-8502, Japan.
kawamori@meijo-u.ac.jp
1
1 Introduction
In this paper, we define extractiveness of contest success functions (CSFs). In a con-
test, which is formalized by Tullock (1980), contestants make an effort, and a winner
of a prize is determined according to a probability distribution, which depends on
efforts. A function that maps from effort tuples to winning probability distributions
is called a contest success function (CSF). We consider the design of CSFs that ex-
tract values of the prize through contestants’ efforts. We say that a CSF is extractive
if under this CSF, there exists a Nash equilibrium such that the aggregate effort is
equal to the maximum value (the maximum of contestants’ values of the prize). We
also say that a CSF is strictly extractive if this CSF is extractive, and under this
CSF, in every Nash equilibrium, the aggregate effort is equal to the maximum value.
Focusing on observability of contestants’ values of the prize, we present CSFs
satisfying extractiveness. Firstly, we consider the case in which contestants’ values are
observable for the contest designer. In the subcase in which the number of players is
greater than 2, or players have a common value, we present a strictly extractive CSF.
In the subcase in which the number of players is 2, and the players have heterogeneous
values, we present an extractive CSF, and show that there does not exist a strictly
extractive CSF, even though the contest designer can fully use the information of the
values. The aggregate effort equivalence between Nash equilibria holds in the former
subcase but does not in the latter subcase. Secondly, we consider the case in which
the values are unobservable for the contest designer. We show that there does not
exist a CSF extractive under every value tuple. We consider the subcase in which
players have a common value unobservable for the contest designer. We examine
the CSF such that the winning probabilities are proportional to the aa−1th powers of
efforts, where a is an integer in [2, n] (n is the number of contestants). We show that
under every common value, this CSF is extractive, this CSF with a = 2 is strictly
extractive, and this CSF with a > 2 is not strictly extractive. Thus, the aggregate
effort equivalence across Nash equilibria holds under a = 2 but does not under a > 2.
Several papers have presented CSFs that are extractive but not strictly extractive
in the observable-value case. In the 2-contestant common-value case, Glazer (1993)
presented a CSF such that a certain contestant wins if their effort is their value, and
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the other contestant wins otherwise (Subsection 3.1). In the 2-contestant case (the
n-contestant case, resp.), Nti (2004) (Franke et al. (2018), resp.) presented a CSF
such that a contestant with the maximum value wins if their effort is greater than or
equal to their value, and a contestant with the second highest value, which may be
equal to the maximum value, wins otherwise (Proposition 2 (Proposition 4.7, resp.)).
These CSFs are extractive. However, they are not strictly extractive, because there
exists a Nash equilibrium such that every contestant’s effort is zero.1 Meanwhile, we
present strictly extractive CSFs in the 3-or-more-contestant or common-value case.
Several papers have presented CSFs that are reduced to CSFs extractive in the
unobservable-common-value case. In the 2-contestant case, Nti (2004) (Epstein et al.
(2013); Ewerhart (2017), resp.) presented a CSF that maximizes the aggregate effort
in a class of CSFs (Section 4 (Subsection 4.2; Proposition 6, resp.)). In the n-
contestant common-value case, Michaels (1988) did so (Subsection 2.1). Each CSF
in Nti (2004), Epstein et al. (2013) and Ewerhart (2017) in the common-value case
(the CSF in Michaels (1988), resp.) is the CSF such that the winning probabilities are
proportional to the 2nd ( nn−1th, resp.) powers of efforts, and it is in the unobservable-
common-value case because it does not depend on the common value. The CSF using
the 2nd power is strictly extractive in the 2-contestant case. We show that this CSF
is also strictly extractive in the n-contestant case. The CSF using the nn−1th power
is extractive. We show that this CSF is not strictly extractive. We also show that
in the n-contestant case, CSFs such that the winning probabilities are proportional
to the aa−1 th powers of efforts (2 ≤ a ≤ n) is extractive. Under this CSF, any set
of a contestants is the set of active contestants (i.e., contestants whose efforts are
positive) in some Nash equilibrium. Thus, by selecting a and suggesting a Nash
equilibrium, the contest designer can choose an arbitrary set of two-or-more active
contestants. If the contest designer has a preference such that contestants’ efforts are
complementary with each other, they may most prefer the CSF with a = n.
Several papers have shown extraction of values in mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.
Hillman and Riley (1989) (Baye et al. (1996), resp.) showed that in the all-pay auc-
1 Nti (2004) suggested that if the CSF is modified as the threshold of effort is slightly lowered, the Nash
equilibrium such that every contestant’s effort is zero is removed. However, under this modified CSF, in a
unique Nash equilibrium, the aggregate effort is slightly smaller than the maximum value.
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tion, if the highest two values are equal, the expected aggregate effort is equal to the
maximum value in any mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (the second last paragraph
in Section 3 (Theorem 1, resp.)). Alcalde and Dahm (2010) showed that under CSFs
satisfying some conditions, there exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium such that
if the highest two values are equal, the expected aggregate effort is equal to the
maximum value (Theorem 3.2). We show extraction of values in pure-strategy Nash
equilibria.
Several papers have considered maximization of the aggregate effort in a class
of CSFs. CSFs using the following devices have been examined: concave technolo-
gies and power technologies2 in the lottery contest (Nti (2004)); power technologies in
the lottery contest (Michaels (1988)); biases multiplying efforts in the lottery contest,
(Franke et al. (2013)); biases multiplying efforts with power technologies in the lot-
tery contest and biases multiplying efforts the all-pay auction auction (Epstein et al.
(2013));3 biases multiplying efforts in the lottery contest and the all-pay auction
(Franke et al. (2014a)); head starts added to efforts in the lottery contest and all-pay
auction (Franke et al. (2014b)); biases multiplying efforts given a power technology
in the lottery contest (Ewerhart (2017)); biases multiplying efforts and head starts
added to efforts in the lottery contest and the all-pay auction (Franke et al. (2018)).
Fang (2002) compared the simple lottery contest and the simple all-pay auction. Ow-
ing to restriction on forms of CSFs, the maximized aggregate effort is not equal to
the maximum value except for the above-mentioned results. In our paper, because
no restriction is imposed on forms of CSFs, the extraction of values is achieved.
Several papers have considered the aggregate effort under asymmetric informa-
tion. In Kirkegaard (2012), Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2016), Matros and Possajennikov
(2016), Drugov and Ryvkin (2017) and Olszewski and Siegel (2020), the values or
the productivities of efforts are private information. In our paper, in the observable-
value case, the contest designer and contestants know all contestants’ values; in the
unobservable case, the contest designer knows none of the contestants’ values, but
contestants know all contestants’ values.
2 A concave (power, resp.) technology is a concave (power, resp.) function that transforms efforts. The
winning probabilities are determined according to the transformed efforts.
3 Epstein et al. (2011) considered the same class of CSF but a different objective of the contest designer,
which is the weighted sum of the aggregate effort and the welfare.
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As well as the existing papers on maximization of the aggregate effort, our paper
provides CSFs a positive foundation.4,5 In rent-seeking interpretation, the contest
designer (politician) wants to maximize contestants’ efforts, because if the efforts
are political contributions, they obtain monetary benefit from the efforts, and if the
efforts are political lobbying, they flaunt their power by the efforts. Thus, they
should determine the CSF as it maximizes the efforts. Hence, they should choose an
extractive CSF if it exists.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 presents our results. Section 4 discusses questions for future research. The
proofs of all propositions are provided in Appendix.
2 Model
For any sets X, Y and I, any f : X → Y I and any x ∈ X and i ∈ I, let fi (x) be the
value f (x) for i.
Let N be a finite set such that |N | ≥ 2: N is the set of contestants. Let
n := |N |. Let X := RN≥0: X is the set of tuples of contestants’ efforts. Let
∆ :=
{
p ∈ RN≥0 |
∑
i∈N pi = 1
}
: the set of tuples of contestants’ success probabili-
ties (for any p ∈ ∆ and any i ∈ N , pi is the probability of contestant i’s winning).
Let F := {f | f : X → ∆}: F is the set of contest success functions (CSFs). Let
V := RN>0: the set of tuples of contestants’ values of the prize. For any f ∈ F and any
v ∈ V , let ufv : X → RN such that for any x ∈ X and i ∈ N , ufvi (x) = fi (x) vi−xi:
ufvi (x) is contestant i’s utility from effort tuple x (fi (x) vi is the expected value that
they obtain, and xi is the cost of their effort).
For any f ∈ F and any v ∈ V ,
(
N,X, ufv
)
is a strategic form game: N is the set
of players, X is the set of strategy tuples, and ufv is the function that maps each
strategy tuple to the payoff tuple by it. For any f ∈ F and any v ∈ V , let Efv be
the set of Nash equilibria in
(
N,X, ufv
)
.
Let Vˆ := {v ∈ V | ∀i, j ∈ N (vi = vj)}: the set of value tuples such that all
4 Jia et al. (2013) referred to this as the optimally-derived foundation, which is one of four types of
foundations.
5 Some papers have provided CSFs axiomatic foundations (e.g., Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis
(1998)).
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contestants have a common value. For any v ∈ V , let mv := maxi∈N vi and
Mv := argmaxi∈N vi: m
v is the maximum of contestants’ values of the prize, and
Mv is the set of contestants who have the maximum value.
3 Results
First, we show that the maximum value of the prize is an upper bound of the equi-
librium aggregate effort. Subsequently, we seek CSFs under which the equilibrium
aggregate effort is equal to the maximum value in the case in which the values are
observable to the contest designer and the case in which they are unobservable, re-
spectively. Note that the values are observable to contestants.
3.1 Bound of aggregate effort
For any CSF and any value tuple, in any Nash equilibrium, the aggregate effort is
less than or equal to the maximum value.
Proposition 1. Let f ∈ F and v ∈ V . Let x∗ ∈ Efv. Then,
∑
i∈N x
∗
i ≤ m
v.
We say that a CSF is extractive if in some Nash equilibrium, the aggregate effort
is equal to the maximum value. We say that a CSF is strictly extractive if it is
extractive, and in any Nash equilibrium, the aggregate effort is equal to the maximum
value.
Definition 1. Let f ∈ F and v ∈ V . f is extractive under v if there exists x∗ ∈ Efv
such that
∑
i∈N x
∗
i = m
v. f is strictly extractive under v if f is extractive under v
and for all x∗ ∈ Efv ,
∑
i∈N x
∗
i = m
v.
3.2 Observable-value case
We consider the case in which the contest designer can observe contestants’ values
and thus, can design CSFs dependent on the values.
Under any value tuple, if the number of contestants is greater than or equal to 3,
or all contestants have a common value, some CSF is strictly extractive; otherwise,
some CSF is extractive, but any CSF is not strictly extractive. Thus, the aggregate
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effort equivalence across Nash equilibria holds in the former case but does not in the
latter case.
Proposition 2. Let v ∈ V . Suppose that n ≥ 3. Let f ∈ F such that for some
distinct i, j, k ∈ N such that i ∈Mv, for any x ∈ X, (i) if xi = m
v, then fi (x) = 1,
(ii) if xi 6= m
v and xj > 0, then fj (x) = 1, and (iii) if xi 6= m
v and xj = 0, then
fk (x) = 1. Then, f is strictly extractive under v.
Proposition 3. Let v ∈ V . Suppose that n = 2 and v ∈ Vˆ . Let f ∈ F such
that for any i ∈ N , any j ∈ N \ {i} and any x ∈ X, if xk > 0 for any k ∈ N ,
fi (x) =
1xi=m
v−1xj=mv+1
2 ; otherwise, fi (x) =
1xi>0
−1xj>0+1
2 . Then, f is strictly
extractive under v.
Proposition 4. Let v ∈ V . Suppose that n = 2 and v /∈ Vˆ . (i) Let f ∈ F such that
for some i ∈ Mv, for any x ∈ X, fi (x) = 1xi=mv . Then, f is extractive under v.
(ii) Let f ∈ F . f is not strictly extractive under v.
The above CSFs make the contestant with the maximum value win with certainty
(or with probability 12 ) if their effort is equal to the maximum value (or
1
2 of the
maximum value), in order that the aggregate effort is equal to the maximum value.
In the 3-or-more contestant or common-value case, the above CSFs give contestants
an incentive to make a positive effort, to exclude the Nash equilibrium such that
every contestant’s effort is zero. In the other case, under any extractive CSF, there
exists a Nash equilibrium such that every contestant’s effort is zero.
3.3 Unobservable-value case
We consider the case in which the contest designer cannot observe contestants’ values,
and design CSFs independent of the values.
For any CSF f , for some value tuple v, f is not extractive under v.
Proposition 5. Let f ∈ F . Then, for some v ∈ V , f is not extractive under v.
We focus on the common-value case and define candidates of CSFs (strictly)
extractive under any common value. Let f ∈ F such that for some a ∈ N such that
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2 ≤ a ≤ n, for any i ∈ N and any x ∈ X,
fi (x) =


x
a
a−1
i∑
j∈N x
a
a−1
j
if ∃j ∈ N (xj > 0)
1
n otherwise.
f is extractive under any common value; f with a = 2 is strictly extractive under
any common value; under any common value, f with a ≥ 3 is not strictly extractive.
Thus, the aggregate effort equivalence across Nash equilibria holds under a = 2 but
does not under a ≥ 3.
Proposition 6. Let v ∈ Vˆ . Then, f is extractive under v.
Remark 1. As seen in the proof, for any x ∈ X, x ∈ Efv if for some A ∈ 2N such
that |A| = a, for any i ∈ A, xi =
mv
a and for any i ∈ N \A, xi = 0.
Proposition 7. Suppose that a = 2. Let v ∈ Vˆ . Then, f is strictly extractive under
v.
Remark 2. As seen in the proof, for any x ∈ X, x ∈ Efv if and only if for some
A ∈ 2N such that |A| = 2, for any i ∈ A, xi =
mv
2 and for any i ∈ N \ A, xi = 0.
Proposition 8. Suppose that 3 ≤ a ≤ n. Let v ∈ Vˆ . Then, f is not strictly
extractive under v.
Remark 3. As seen in the proof, for any x ∈ X, x ∈ Efv if for some A ∈ 2N such
that |A| = a − 1, for any i ∈ A, xi =
mva(a−2)
(a−1)3
and for any i ∈ N \ A, xi = 0. The
aggregate effort in the strategy tuples is (a− 1) va(a−2)
(a−1)3
= va(a−2)
(a−1)2
< v. Let a ∈ NN
such that 3 ≤ an ≤ n and limn→∞ an =∞. Then, limn→∞
van(an−2)
(an−1)
2 = v.
Under f , each contestant’s effort x is transformed to x
a
a−1 , and the winning
probabilities are determined proportionally to the transformed efforts. As a is larger,
the elasticity of transformed effort x
a
a−1 to effort x, dx
a
a−1 /dx
x
a
a−1 /x
= aa−1 , is smaller; thus,
in the Nash equilibrium such that the aggregate effort is equal to the maximum
value, each active contestant’s effort is smaller, but the number of active contestants
is larger.
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4 Discussion
In the unobservable-value case, unless a common value is assumed, there does not
exist extractive CSF. In such case, it is necessary to derive CSFs that maximize the
expectation of the aggregate effort under some belief on value tuples. For example,
this problem is formalized as
max
(f,x)∈F×XV
∫
v∈V
∑
i∈N
xi (v) dP (v)
s.t. ∀v ∈ V
(
x (v) ∈ Efv
)
∧ x is measurable,
where P is a cumulative distribution function on V (the designer’s belief on value
tuples). This problem remains for future research.
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Appendix
Lemma 1. Let f ∈ F , v ∈ V , x∗ ∈ Efv and i ∈ N . Then, ufvi (x
∗) ≥ 0, and
fi (x
∗) vi ≥ x
∗
i .
Proof. Because x∗ ∈ Efv, ufvi (x
∗) ≥ ufvi
(
0, x∗−i
)
= fi
(
0, x∗−i
)
vi ≥ 0. Thus,
fi (x
∗) vi ≥ x
∗
i .
Lemma 2. Let v ∈ R>0 and a, b ∈ N such that 2 ≤ b ≤ a. Let x
∗ := va(b−1)
b2(a−1)
. Let
u : R≥0 → R such that for any x ∈ R≥0, u (x) =
x
a
a−1
x
a
a−1+(b−1)(x∗)
a
a−1
v − x. Then,
x∗ ∈ argmaxx∈R≥0 u (x).
Proof. Let φ : R≥0 → R such that for any x ∈ R≥0,
φ (x) = −
(
(2b− 1) (x∗)
a
a−1 + x
a
a−1
) a−1∑
i=0
(x∗)
i
a−1 x
a−1−i
a−1 + b2 (x∗)
2a−1
a−1 .
For any x ∈ R≥0,
du (x)
dx
=
φ (x)
(
x
1
a−1 − (x∗)
1
a−1
)
(
x
a
a−1 + (b− 1) (x∗)
a
a−1
)2 .
Note that φ (0) = (b− 1)2 (x∗)
2a−1
a−1 > 0, and φ (x∗) = −b (2a− b) (x∗)
2a−1
a−1 < 0. Then,
by the intermediate value theorem, there exists x¯ ∈ (0, x∗) such that φ (x¯) = 0. Let
x ∈ R≥0. Because φ is strictly decreasing, φ (x) R 0 if and only if x ⋚ x¯. Thus,
du (x)
dx


≤ 0 if x ≤ x¯
≥ 0 if x¯ < x ≤ x∗
< 0 if x > x∗.
Note that u (0) = 0 ≤ u (x∗). Then, for any x ∈ R≥0, u (x
∗) ≥ u (x).
Proof of Proposition 1 By Lemma 1, for any i ∈ N , x∗i ≤ vifi (x
∗) ≤ mvfi (x
∗).
Hence,
∑
i∈N x
∗
i ≤ m
v
∑
i∈N fi (x
∗) = mv.
Proof of Proposition 2 Let x∗ ∈ X such that x∗i = m
v and for any l ∈ N \ {i},
x∗l = 0. Then,
∑
l∈N x
∗
l = m
v. It suffices to show that Efv = {x∗i }.
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For any xi ∈ R≥0 \ {x
∗
i }, u
fv
i (x
∗) = 0 ≥ −xi = u
fv
i
(
xi, x
∗
−i
)
. For any l ∈ N \ {i}
and any xl ∈ R≥0 \ {x
∗
l }, u
fv
l (x
∗) = 0 ≥ −xl = u
fv
l
(
xl, x
∗
−l
)
. Thus, x∗ ∈ Efv.
Let x ∈ X \ {x∗}. If xi = m
v, then for some l ∈ N \ {i}, xl > 0, and u
fv
l (x) =
−xl < 0 = u
fv
l (0, x−l). If xi 6= m
v and xj > 0, then u
fv
j (x) = vj − xj < vj −
xj
2 =
ufvj
(xj
2 , x−j
)
. If xi 6= m
v and xj = 0, then u
fv
j (x) = 0 <
vj
2 = u
fv
j
( vj
2 , x−j
)
. Thus,
x /∈ Efv.
Proof of Proposition 3 Let x∗ ∈ X such that for any i ∈ N , x∗i =
mv
2 . Then,∑
i∈N x
∗
i = m
v. It suffices to show that Efv = {x∗}.
For any i ∈ N and any xi ∈ R≥0 \ {x
∗
i }, u
fv
i (x
∗) = 0 ≥ −xi = u
fv
i
(
xi, x
∗
−i
)
.
Thus, x∗ ∈ Efv.
Let x ∈ X \ {x∗}. If for any i ∈ N , xi > 0, for some i, j ∈ N , xi =
mv
2 and
xj 6=
mv
2 , then u
fv
j (x) = −xj < 0 = u
f
j (0, x−j). If for any i ∈ N , xi > 0 and
xi 6=
mv
2 , then for some i ∈ N , u
fv
i (x) =
vi
2 − xi <
vi
2 = u
fv
i
(
mv
2 , x−i
)
. If for some
i, j ∈ N , xi > 0 and xj = 0, then u
fv
i (x) = vi − xi < vi −
xi
2 = u
fv
i
(
xi
2 , x−i
)
. If for
any i ∈ N , xi = 0, then for some i ∈ N , u
fv
i (x) =
vi
2 <
3vi
4 = u
fv
i
(
vi
4 , x−i
)
. Thus,
x /∈ Efv.
Proof of Proposition 4 (i) Let j ∈ N \ {i}. Let x∗ ∈ X such that x∗i = m
v,
and x∗j = 0. For any xi ∈ R≥0 \ {x
∗
i }, u
fv
i (x
∗) = 0 ≥ −xi = u
fv
i
(
xi, x
∗
−i
)
. For
any xj ∈ R≥0 \
{
x∗j
}
, ufvj (x
∗) = 0 ≥ −xj = u
fv
i
(
xj , x
∗
−j
)
. Thus, x∗ ∈ Efv .
∑
k∈N x
∗
k = m
v.
(ii) Let i, j ∈ N such that vi > vj . Suppose that f is extractive. Then, there exists
x∗ ∈ Efv such that x∗i+x
∗
j = m
v. By Lemma 1,mv = x∗i+x
∗
j ≤ fi (x
∗)mv+fj (x
∗) vj .
Thus, fj (x
∗) (mv − vj) ≤ 0. Hence, fj (x
∗) = 0. Thus, by Lemma 1, x∗j = 0. Thus,
x∗i = m
v. Hence, 0 = ufvi (x
∗) ≥ ufvi
(
0, x∗−i
)
= fi
(
0, x∗−i
)
vi. Thus, fi
(
0, x∗−i
)
= 0.
Hence, fi (0, 0) = 0. Let y
∗ ∈ X such that y∗i = y
∗
j = 0. Because x
∗ ∈ Efv and
x∗j = y
∗
j , for any yi ∈ R≥0, u
fv
i (y
∗) = fi (0, 0) vi = 0 = u
fv
i (x
∗) ≥ ufvi
(
yi, x
∗
−i
)
=
ufvi
(
yi, y
∗
−i
)
; for any yj ∈ R≥0, u
fv
j (y
∗) = fj (0, 0) vj = vj ≥ fj
(
yj, y
∗
−j
)
vj − yj =
ufvj
(
yj, y
∗
−j
)
. Thus, y∗ ∈ Efv. y∗i + y
∗
j = 0 6= m
v. Thus, f is not strictly extractive
under v.
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Proof of Proposition 5 Suppose that for any v ∈ V , there exists x∗ ∈ Efv such
that
∑
i∈N x
∗
i = m
v (assumption to a contradiction).
Let v ∈ V such that for some i ∈ N , for any j ∈ N \ {i}, vi > vj. Let x
∗ ∈ Efv
such that
∑
j∈N x
∗
j = vi. By Lemma 1, vi =
∑
j∈N x
∗
j ≤
∑
j∈N vjfj (x
∗). Thus,
fi (x
∗) = 1, and for any j ∈ N \ {i}, fj (x
∗) = 0. Hence, by Lemma 1, for any
j ∈ N \ {i}, x∗j = 0, and x
∗
i = vi.
Let v,w ∈ RN>0 such that for some i ∈ N , vi = 1 and wi = 2, and vj < vi and
wj < wi for any j ∈ N \ {i}. Then, by the assumption to a contradiction, there exist
x∗ ∈ Efv and y∗ ∈ Efw such that
∑
j∈N x
∗
j = vi and
∑
j∈N y
∗
j = wi. Thus, x
∗
i = 1
and y∗i = 2, and for any j ∈ N \ {i}. x
∗
j = y
∗
j = 0. Moreover, fi (x
∗) = fi (y
∗) = 1.
Thus, ufwi
(
1, y∗−i
)
= 2fi
(
1, y∗−i
)
− 1 = 2fi (x
∗) − 1 = 1 > 0 = ufwi (y
∗), which
contradicts that y∗ ∈ Efw.
Proof of Proposition 6 Abuse v as the common value (v = mv = vi for any
i ∈ N). Let x∗ ∈ X such that for some A ∈ 2N such that |A| = a, for any i ∈ A,
x∗i =
v
a and for any j ∈ N \ A, x
∗
j = 0. Let i ∈ A. By Lemma 2 with b = a, for any
xi ∈ R≥0, u
fv
i (x
∗) ≥ ufvi
(
xi, x
∗
−i
)
. Let j ∈ N \ A. For any xj ∈ R>0,
ufvj
(
xj, x
∗
−j
)
=
x
a
a−1
j
x
a
a−1
j + a
(
v
a
) a
a−1
v − xj <
x
a
a−1
j
x
a
a−1
j + (a− 1)
(
v
a
) a
a−1
v − xj
= ufvi
(
xj , x
∗
−i
)
≤ ufvi (x
∗) = 0 = ufvj (x
∗) .
Thus, x∗ ∈ Efv.
∑
i∈N x
∗
i = a ·
v
a = v.
Proof of Proposition 7 By Proposition 6, f is extractive.
Abuse v as the common value (v = mv = vi for any i ∈ N). Let x
∗ ∈ Efv . Let
A := {i ∈ N | x∗i > 0} and α := |A|. If α = 0, for some i ∈ N , u
fv
i (x
∗) = vn <
(2n−1)v
2n = u
fv
i
(
v
2n , x
∗
−i
)
, which contradicts that x∗ ∈ Efv. If α = 1, for some i ∈ A,
ufvi (x
∗) = v − x∗i < v −
x∗i
2 = u
fv
i
(
x∗i
2 , x
∗
−i
)
, which contradicts that x∗ ∈ Efv . Thus,
α ≥ 2. Let i ∈ argmaxj∈A x
∗
j . For any k ∈ A,
0 =
∂ufvk
∂xk
(x∗) =
2vx∗k
(∑
l∈A (x
∗
l )
2 − (x∗k)
2
)
(∑
l∈A
(
x∗l
)2)2 − 1.
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Thus, for any k ∈ A\{i} such that x∗k < x
∗
i , x
∗
i
(∑
l∈A (x
∗
l )
2 − (x∗i )
2
)
= x∗k
(∑
l∈A (x
∗
l )
2 − (x∗k)
2
)
,
(x∗i − x
∗
k)
(∑
l∈A\{i,k} (x
∗
l )
2 − x∗ix
∗
k
)
= 0,
∑
l∈A\{i,k} (x
∗
l )
2 = x∗i x
∗
k. Suppose that for
some j ∈ A \ {i}, x∗j < x
∗
i (assumption to a contradiction). Then,
∑
l∈A\{i,j} (x
∗
l )
2 =
x∗ix
∗
j . For any k ∈ A \ {i, j}, (x
∗
k)
2 ≤
∑
l∈A\{i,j} (x
∗
l )
2 = x∗ix
∗
j < (x
∗
i )
2, and thus,
x∗k < x
∗
i . Hence, for any k ∈ A \ {i}, x
∗
k < x
∗
i . Thus, for any k ∈ A \ {i},
x∗ix
∗
j +
(
x∗j
)2
=
∑
l∈A\{i} (x
∗
l )
2 = x∗i x
∗
k + (x
∗
k)
2,
(
x∗j − x
∗
k
)(
x∗j + x
∗
k + x
∗
i
)
= 0,
and x∗j = x
∗
k. Thus, (α− 2)
(
x∗j
)2
= x∗ix
∗
j , and x
∗
i = (α− 2) x
∗
j . Hence, 0 =
∂ufvj
∂xj
(x∗) =
2v(α−1)(α−2)(x∗j)
3
(
(α2−3α+3)(x∗j)
2
)
2 − 1, x
∗
j =
2v(α−1)(α−2)
(α2−3α+3)2
, and α ≥ 3. Thus, ufvj (x
∗) =
(x∗j)
2
((α−2)x∗j)
2
+(α−1)(x∗j)
2 v − x
∗
j = −
v(α(α−3)+1)
(α2−3α+3)2
< 0 = ufvj
(
0, x∗−j
)
, which contradicts
that x∗ ∈ Efv . Hence, for any j ∈ A, x∗j = x
∗
i . Thus, 0 =
∂ufvi
∂xi
(x∗) = 2v(α−1)
α2x∗i
− 1,
and x∗i =
2v(α−1)
α2
. Hence, v(2−α)
α2
= ufvi (x
∗) ≥ ufvi
(
0, x∗−i
)
= 0. Thus, α = 2. Hence,
x∗i =
v
2 . Thus, for any j ∈ A, x
∗
j =
v
2 . Hence,
∑
i∈N x
∗
i = 2 ·
v
2 = v.
Proof of Proposition 8 Abuse v as the common value (v = mv = vi for any
i ∈ N). Let x∗ be a strategy tuple such that for some A ∈ 2N such that |A| = a− 1,
for any i ∈ A, x∗i =
va(a−2)
(a−1)3
and for any j ∈ N \ A, x∗j = 0. Let i ∈ A. By Lemma 2
with b = a − 1, for any xi ∈ R≥0, u
fv
i (x
∗) ≥ ufvi
(
xi, x
∗
−i
)
. Let j ∈ N \ A. For any
xj ∈ R>0,
ufvj
(
xj, x
∗
−j
)
=
xj
(
x
1
a−1
j v − x
a
a−1
j − (a− 1)
(
va(a−2)
(a−1)3
) a
a−1
)
x
a
a−1
j + (a− 1)
(
va(a−2)
(a−1)3
) a
a−1
d
(
vx
1
a−1
j − x
a
a−1
j
)
dxj
=
a
a− 1
x
2−a
a−1
j
(v
a
− xj
)
.
Thus, for any xj ∈ R≥0,
ufvj
(
xj , x
∗
−j
)
≤
xj
((
v
a
) 1
a−1 v −
(
v
a
) a
a−1 − (a− 1)
(
va(a−2)
(a−1)3
) a
a−1
)
x
a
a−1
j + (a− 1)
(
va(a−2)
(a−1)3
) a
a−1
= −
(a− 1) xj
(
v
a
) a
a−1
((
1 + a(a−3)+1
(a−1)3
) a
a−1
− 1
)
x
a
a−1
j + (a− 1)
(
va(a−2)
(a−1)3
) a
a−1
≤ 0 = ufvj (x
∗) .
13
Thus, x∗ ∈ Efv.
∑
i∈N x
∗
i = (a− 1) ·
va(a−2)
(a−1)3
= (a−1)
2−1
(a−1)2
v 6= v. Thus, f is not strictly
extractive under v.
14
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